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The Construction of Rights
KEITH DOWDING London School of Economics
MARTIN VAN HEES University of Groningen
This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approachesto the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights.Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights—social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic,
and Steiner’s approach—we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that
the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rights—
which we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions—where compossibility is not important and rights
cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of
more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they
exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be
exercised are hardly worth the name.
In what sense, if any, do rights exist? If rights are in-stantiated in law but difficult to exercise in practice,do people really have those rights? Can we compare
across countries to see what rights people have both
materially and formally? In this paper we map out the
senses in which rights can be said to have existence. We
suggest a framework for analyzing how rights might be
measured and compared. The framework is supposed
to be relatively neutral between competing conceptions
of rights, though we do argue that rights cannot form
the basis of morality or a system of justice. They are not
foundational since no system of rights worth the name
can be “co-possible” (Nozick 1974) or, more precisely,
“compossible” (Steiner 1994). A system of rights is
compossible to the extent that all persons can exercise
their right and there will be no conflicting duties. In
other words, we suggest that there are no principles of
justice that can deliver a set of rights that do not con-
tain contradictory judgments about the permissibility
of actions. There will always be occasions when people
cannot exercise their rights simultaneously.
Contrary to what some have argued, it does not fol-
low that at least one person does not have a right to do
x simply because two people cannot exercise a right to
do x simultaneously. Having a right does not entail be-
ing able to exercise it. Nevertheless, if rights cannot be
exercised, then they hardly seem worth the name. Did
Zimbabweans really have the right to vote in the Presi-
dential elections of March 9 and 10, 2002? That election
demonstrated how easy it is to disenfranchise voters
simply by taking so long to check names against the list
of registered voters, while voters are just as effectively
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disenfranchised by intimidation, whether organized by
the state, by political parties, or by wandering thugs.
U.S. citizens have the right to vote, but first they must
register and there must be polling stations that recog-
nize that registration and are open long enough for reg-
istered voters to cast their ballot. Some voters claimed
that they were disenfranchised at the U.S. Presidential
election in 2000, as polling officers would not accept
their registration details. The ease of registration differs
across U.S. states and more so across the world, while
the costs of voting also differ. At what level of difficulty
and cost can we say that citizens effectively lose the
right to vote? At what level of health care or educa-
tional opportunity do people have rights to education
or health care? Can we expect poor nations to provide
the same level of rights as rich nations? How might we
weight and compare rights across countries? These are
not easy questions to answer but we try to provide a
framework through which such questions may be ad-
dressed.
This paper is concerned with judging in what sense
people have rights. It provides a framework by which
we can judge to what extent rights exist and to what ex-
tent they can be exercised. While no framework could
be normatively neutral, our framework can encompass
different substantive rights theories. We begin by ex-
amining the noncompossibility of rights, demonstrating
formally that rights are not compossible or, to the ex-
tent that they are, they are not the rights about which
we ordinarily write and speak. According to Steiner
(1994, 2–3), the compossibility of a set of rights is a
necessary condition for the plausibility of any theory of
justice that yields that set. Nevertheless, rights and lib-
erty are fundamental to liberalism, and clashes of rights
are (part of) what politics is all about (see Primus 1999
for an historical account of such clashes and changing
rights talk in American history; see also Wellman 1998).
The fact that rights clash, and that at times my right to
free speech may need to be curtailed by your right to
privacy, or my right of free speech is curtailed by your
right of free speech, does not mean that we do not have
such rights. But in what sense do we have them?
Rawls (1971, 1982) argues that as long as our rights
in these regards are approximately equal, then we have
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a just liberal system. He says that as long as the “central
range of application” of basic liberties is provided for,
the principles of justice are fulfilled. The basic liberties
for Rawls are specified by institutional rules and duties
that form a framework of legally protected paths and
opportunities. As he recognizes, of course, differential
material or educational means entail that not everyone
may exercise their rights equally. Rawls introduces the
idea of the “worth” of liberty to suggest how useful
to people these rights are given the probability that
they can exercise them. For many, however, if someone
has no chance of exercising a right, then the right is
barely worth the name. We do not try to adjudicate this
particular issue here. Rather we provide a framework
for defining rights of different sorts—what we call the
existence conditions of rights—and then suggest a way
of handling whether or not we should judge that those
rights can be said to exist in the forms we define for
a given individual, a group, or society as whole. Such
judgments are made relative to the expectations we
may have for exercising rights given the social and eco-
nomic circumstances of different societies. We specify
the sense in which someone can be said to have a right
(the senses in which a right can exist) and then the
probability that someone can exercise the right. In do-
ing so we specify in a fashion broadly compatible with
Rawls’s (1982) discussion how to identify worthwhile
rights and do so relative to different circumstances. Al-
though rights can and should play an important role in
the theory of justice, they cannot form the basis of a
theory of justic. Rights are essentially constructed.
The extent to which rights exist is not all-or-nothing
when it comes to respecting or exercising those rights.
People have rights even when they cannot exercise
them. First, they may have them formally, when they
do not have them materially. Second, people may have
rights materially even though they cannot always ex-
ercise them. Having a right entails some expectation
that it might be realized, but it does not ensure it. We
believe that this way of representing rights both makes
sense formally and is more in tune with everyday moral
language than other formal accounts of rights discussed
here. First, however, we argue that the allure of rights
compossibility should be avoided.
THE NONCOMPOSSIBILITY OF SEN RIGHTS
Rights may seem obviously noncompossible. The most
striking examples are entitlements, though rights in any
form are not manifestly compossible. For example, if I
claim a right to free speech and you claim a right not to
be subject to abuse, something must give way if I want
to abuse you verbally. Of course, we may need to sort
out whether my right to free speech includes the right to
say the precise words I intend, and whether your right
not to be abused is covered by those words. However,
typically rights do conflict in these sorts of ways.
We can trivially make rights compossible by creating
a dictator who can assign rights as she sees fit to ensure
that no rights ever conflict. (In Steiner [1994] such a
dictator is called the Adjudicator.) She could be careful
and assign type rights so that no conflict occurs—the
easiest way would be to assign all rights to herself and
none to others. Or she could decide the assignation of
a right after a conflict between two sets of the putative
rights has been claimed.1 Juridical decisions do decide
which rights are to be restricted or which given greatest
weight in any conflict, and they might be said to be
part of a construction toward a formally compossible
rights set. However, any formally specified rights set
worth the name is not able to deliver a compossible
set of rights without such an “external” adjudication:
external, that is, to the rights set as understood to be in
conflict (Steiner 1998, 265ff). Furthermore, in practice
any external adjudication is likely to involve considera-
tions that are not strictly rights-based (as the discussion
of cases in Wellman 1995, chap. 7 shows). To overcome
the triviality of such a set of compossible rights, formal
theorists normally assign a set of reasonable conditions
and then see whether conflicts emerge. For example,
we can see a simple proof of the noncompossibility of
rights in terms of Amartya Sen’s account of minimal
liberalism.2
One way of representing Sen is to view society
as a social decision function, that is, as a function
F that defines possible combinations of individual
preference orderings R1, . . . , Rn to a “social pref-
erence” R= F(R1, . . . , Rn).3 Whatever the feasibility
constraints on the alternatives open to society, F pro-
vides the answer to the question of what is best for
society by generating the social preference relation R.
For any situation the best social state relative to R is
chosen from the set of feasible social states. Obviously,
it is thereby assumed that the social preference relation
always contains a best element.4
Sen defines a condition of minimal liberalism (ML),
suggesting that it is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for rights holding. ML states that there are at
least two individuals such that for each of them there is
at least one pair of alternatives over which each is deci-
sive. An individual is decisive over a pair of social states
(x, y) if it is always the case that if the person strictly
1 We say more about this issue below.
2 The term “right” is used in the broadest sense in this essay. We
examine the compossibility and existence of rights as they are dis-
cussed in both philosophical and everyday moral discourse. Thus the
“right to free speech” here may be seen as a liberty to speak on
various topics, an immunity against being divested of that liberty,
and rights against certain types of interference with that liberty. Sim-
ilarly, the Sen rights specified in his example of the right to read a
book seemingly require, at least, a liberty- and a property-right. The
copossible rights Nozick (1974, 166) refers to must be both. We do not
attempt to sort out these issues conceptually in this paper; rather we
deliberately use the term “right” somewhat loosely but claim that our
analysis can be applied easily to a more technical Hohfeldian analysis
of rights, entitlements, privileges, liberties, and so on. In places we
suggest how that application to other Hohfeldian categories may be
accomplished. Especially clear statements of a Hohfeldian position
are given in Kramer (1998, 2001).
3 R describes the weak preference relation (“at least as good as”).
From R the strict preference relation P (“better than”) and the in-
difference relation I (“equally as good as”) are derived in the usual
way.
4 This implies that the social preference relation needs to be acyclic
and complete.
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prefers x to y, then society should strictly prefer x to
y, and conversely, if that person strictly prefers y to x,
then society should strictly prefer y to x. The condition
of minimal liberalism, ML, thus states, there are indi-
viduals i and j and distinct pairs of alternatives (x, y)
and (z, v) such that [yPi x → yPx and xPi y → xPy]
and [zPjv → zPv and vPj z → vPz].
Sen’s liberal paradox states that condition ML can-
not be satisfied simultaneously with the (weak) Pareto
condition (PAR) and the condition of universal domain
(UD). According to the Pareto condition a strict pref-
erence that is shared by all individuals should also be
represented in the social preference relation: If all indi-
viduals strictly prefer some alternative x to some other
alternative y, then society should also strictly prefer x
to y. The condition of universal domain demands that
a social preference relation is generated for any logi-
cally possible configuration of individual orderings: No
individual preference orderings are excluded a priori.
The incompatibility of the three conditions is easy to
demonstrate. Take the simple case in which there are
only three alternatives, x, y, and z, and two individuals.
Assume that the two individuals, i and j , have rights
over x and y and over y and z, respectively. Given UD,
suppose that individual i strictly prefers y to x and x
to z, while j strictly prefers x to z and z to y. We then
see that i ’s rights over x and y imply yPx and that j ’s
rights over y and z imply zPy. The Pareto principle
yields xPz, which means that we have xPzPyPx: The
social preference relation is cyclic and hence does not
contain a best alternative.
Sen’s results show that, under the conditions UD
and PAR, a person’s decisiveness over one pair of al-
ternatives is incompatible with other persons having
any rights at all. To see rights in terms of decisiveness
over pairs of alternatives means that, in a very strong
sense, individual rights are incompatible. However, the
incompatibility of Sen rights follows only if the social
decision function satisfies UD and PAR. It can easily be
shown that if one of these conditions is dropped, com-
possibility remains possible. Indeed, much of the early
literature directly following Sen’s theorem consisted of
the derivation of such possibility results arising from
relaxing the conditions (see Wriglesworth 1985 for an
overview). To what extent can such relaxations be seen
as showing the compossibility of rights?
A relaxation of UD, that is, a restriction of the do-
main of the social decision function, can be interpreted
in two ways. First, it could be used normatively. It has,
for instance, been shown that the liberal paradox arises
in cases in which individuals are “meddlesome,” and it
has been argued that rights should not protect “med-
dlesomeness” (Blau 1975). We could ban “deviant pref-
erence profiles” from the social decision mechanism
(Goodin 1986). Alternatively, rather than abandoning
UD, a weaker notion of decisiveness could be used—a
person’s strict preference regarding a pair of alterna-
tives over which he/she has a right should be reflected
in the social preference relation only if the person is
nonmeddlesome. It is not the place here to assess the
normative appeal of abandoning UD or of using do-
main information to weaken the definition of rights.
However, such approaches are rather ad hoc. Defining
meddlesome preferences is not straightforward. To call
them “meddlesome” already labels them as “wrong,”
but we might call some of them “caring preferences” or,
more neutrally, “other-regarding.” Most of us want our
loved ones to care about us, even if this means that they
have preferences regarding our well-being that differ
from our own. Abandoning UD may be one route out
of Sen’s paradox, but it is a route with almost as many
problems as the theorem itself.
Second, a relaxing of UD can be justified ontologi-
cally. In this view, the domain can be restricted because
the situations in which conflicts between rights occur
do not “really” belong to the realm of the possible.
The restricted domain is thought to describe more cor-
rectly the set of possible worlds: Some configurations
of individual preference orderings may, for instance,
be psychologically impossible and may therefore never
be realized, and conflicts in those psychologically im-
possible worlds need not bother us. Such an approach
ensures rights compossibility by adopting an alterna-
tive interpretation of the notion of possible worlds; it
does not deny that under a logical interpretation of
that notion, Sen’s liberal paradox establishes the non-
compossibility of rights. More importantly, however,
the claim that the preference profiles that lead to prob-
lems may be logically possible but may be impossible
by some other criterion simply cannot be sustained.
There is, for instance, nothing odd about Sen’s original
illustration of the paradox—the Prude and the Lewd
having to decide whether to read or not to read a copy of
Lady Chatterly’s Lover. Whatever one’s metaphysical
opinions regarding the notion of “possibility” are, that
situation certainly seems possible.
What about relaxing the Pareto condition? Can that
secure the compossibility of Sen rights? Such a relax-
ation is Sen’s (1982) suggestion. In his view, ML is more
important than PAR and the latter therefore has to
yield. However, the Pareto condition itself describes
certain rights, to wit, the rights of society. After all, the
Pareto condition states that the group of all individuals
is decisive for any pair of alternatives. Hence, we cannot
really say, as we did above, that Sen’s result only es-
tablished the noncompossibility of rights given a social
decision mechanism satisfying UD and PAR. Instead,
we should say that, given UD, the result establishes
the noncompossibility of individual and certain group
rights (see in this respect Steven and Foster’s [1978]
extension to conflicts between group rights; see also
Gekker 1985).
It could be argued that a theory of justice need not
attach much importance to the group rights exempli-
fied by PAR, and so the result merely shows that some
allocations of rights are noncompossible. And, indeed,
Sen’s arguments for a relaxation of the Pareto condition
could be interpreted as a powerful defense of such a
position. However, even without group rights, there is
a serious compossibility problem with Sen rights. Alan
Gibbard (1974) posed the problem, in what is known
as Gibbard’s liberal paradox. He showed that with a
slight formal strengthening of ML, compatible with the
spirit of Sen’s defense of ML, impossibility results arise
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even when the Pareto condition is dropped altogether.
The condition ML does not specify over which pairs of
alternatives an individual is decisive—it states only that
at least two individuals are decisive over some pairs. In
his various examples, however, Sen assumes that in-
dividuals are decisive over those pairs of alternatives
that differ only with respect to some aspect pertaining
to that individual’s life. Gibbard’s strengthening of ML
essentially comes down to this same assumption. As-
sume that each alternative can be described as a vector
of features or characteristics and let, for instance, some
feature—say, component a of the vector—stand for per-
son i reading or not reading a particular book (say,
Lady’s Chatterly’s Lover), whereas another feature—
component b—describes whether j reads a copy of that
same book. Gibbard’s condition would be satisfied if i
is decisive for any pair of alternatives that differ only
with respect to i reading the book or not (that is, that
differ only with respect to their ath component) and
if j is decisive for all pairs of alternatives that differ
only with respect to j reading the book or not (that is,
that differ only with respect to their bth component).
Gibbard subsequently shows that there is no social de-
cision function that satisfies such a strengthened ver-
sion of ML and also satisfies UD. In other words, given
UD, any allocation of individual rights turns out to be
noncompossible.
Many authors have suggested that the Sen approach
is basically flawed. As Gibbard (1982, 597–98) himself
later formulated it,
These liberal paradoxes carry with them, then, an air of
sophistry: they must in some way be creating problems
that do not really exist. . . . To talk about the paradoxes,
then, is to explore the role of one kind of mathematics in
thought about social norms and organization. What is it
about the mathematical apparatus of social choice theory
that apparently so misapplies to questions of liberty?
In our opinion, there are at least two problems with
the social choice-theoretic account of rights. First, a Sen
right is defined as a form of power: Having a right means
being able to determine a part of the social preference
relation.5 However, we often think of people having
rights without having power. Consider a right to buy
tickets for some concert. Obviously, one can have such
a right even though one cannot ensure that one will
indeed get a ticket, say, because there are more people
who want to attend the concert than there are avail-
able tickets. Indeed, to say that people lack a certain
power does not necessarily imply that people lack cer-
tain rights or liberties or that the rights of individuals
are noncompossible. The latter conclusion follows only
if the notion of noncompossible rights is considerably
stretched: It now refers to the impossibility of mutually
compatible powers. And this is precisely what happens
in the Sen approach—if each person’s preference for
5 Note that here, and in the rest of the paper, we do not use the
term “power” in the Hohfeld sense in which it forms a type of right,
that is, the one that describes the permissibility of bringing about
changes in normative (legal or moral) relations. For a game-theoretic
description of the various Hohfeld types of rights, see Van Hees 1995.
attending the concert leads to a veto of the outcomes
in which he/she does not have a ticket, a cycle of the
social preference relation emerges.
Second, even if all rights were powers, defining rights
in terms of decisiveness makes it difficult to distinguish
between having rights and exercising them. If a person
strictly prefers x to y and is decisive over (x, y), then,
by Sen’s account of rights, x is socially preferred to
y. The fact that a person has a strict preference and
is decisive entails that the social preference relation is
partly fixed, that is, that having rights is equivalent to
exercising them. But we normally make a distinction
between having a right and exercising it. If I have a
right to read a book, I have that right whether or not I
ever read the book.
One way of avoiding the conclusion that, in the so-
cial choice approach, one cannot distinguish between
having and exercising a right is to say that the pref-
erences of an individual can be interpreted as choices
made by that individual (see, e.g., Sen 1992, 148). The
rights that individuals have are described by the sets
for which they are decisive, and the preferences of the
individuals describe the ways in which they decide to
exercise them. Suppose that I strictly prefer x to y, that
is, suppose that I choose x when faced with a choice
between x and y. This choice is hypothetical since I
am confronted not only with x and y, but also with
many other alternatives. In this approach, people exer-
cise rights by making certain hypothetical choices. Two
observations are in order. First, the noncompossibil-
ity of Sen rights does not disappear. The impossibility
result still remains valid but can now be understood as
the impossibility of translating all relevant hypothetical
choices into one coherent social preference relation:
Individuals cannot always exercise their rights simul-
taneously. Second, both the exercise and the possible
violation of rights are about the choices we actually
make, not about hypothetical ones.
Thus, the social choice definition of rights leads to
counterintuitive conclusions since all rights are as-
sumed to be powers, and the distinction between having
rights and exercising them evaporates. Dissatisfaction
with these counterintuitive consequences has led to a
different way of formalizing rights, viz., through the use
of game-theoretic tools. In the next section we briefly
sketch the outlines of the game-theoretic approach.
GAME FORMS AND EFFECTIVITY
FUNCTIONS
Recently, social choice writers have developed game-
theoretic approaches to the study of rights and free-
doms (Fleurbaey and Van Hees 2000; Gaertner,
Pattanaik, and Suzumura 1992; Ga¨rdenfors 1981;
Hammond 1996; Pattanaik 1996). The basic idea un-
derlying game-theoretic approaches is that rights do
not depend on individuals’ preferences, as is the case
with a definition in terms of decisiveness, but on the
things individuals are and are not allowed to do, that
is, on their admissible strategies. The approaches were
designed to characterize rights formally in a manner
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preferable to the ML condition but were not designed
to overcome the “impossibility” result (though see Van
Hees 1999, 2000b).
Two types of game-theoretic approaches can be
distinguished. The first, based on work originally by
Ga¨rdenfors (1981), suggests that rights may be repre-
sented by effectivity functions. In this approach rights
are described in terms of sets of outcomes of which a
person can secure elements. The right to wear a black
shirt means that a person is effective for a set of out-
comes that are all characterized by that person wear-
ing a black shirt. If the right is exercised, one of those
outcomes is realized. The second approach represents
rights directly in terms of a normal game form. A game
form is a game where the utility function of each player
remains unassigned. So it includes a list of the play-
ers, a list of alternative strategies for each player, and
an outcome from every combination of strategies that
may be chosen. Taking the notion of “admissibility” as
a primitive term, that is, as a term that is not further
explicated, some of the strategies of the individuals are
labelled admissible while others are not. The rights of
individuals are subsequently specified by the freedom
each has to choose any of their admissible strategies
and/or by the obligation not to choose a nonadmissi-
ble strategy (Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura 1992,
p. 173; Suzumura 1991, p. 229).
The two approaches are not independent of each
other. One way of viewing the effectivity approach is to
say that it specifies how to distill the exact specification
of rights from a given normal game form. Of course, we
then need to make clear in what circumstances a person
can be said to be effective for a set of outcomes, that is,
what it means to say that a person can “secure” a cer-
tain outcome. Two types of effectivily have been used:
α-effectivity and β-effectivity. The first is defined as an
individual’s power to force an outcome from any set:
Given a normal game form, a person is α-effective for
a set of outcomes under any strategy that, regardless of
whatever admissible strategies the others adopt, leads
to an outcome belonging to that set. The notion of β-
effectivity is much weaker since it does not guarantee
that a person can secure some outcome no matter what
anyone else does—rather it is defined by the absence of
a blocking power by the others: A person is β-effective
for a set A if the group consisting of all others is not
α-effective for a set disjoint from A.
There is a potential problem, however, with inducing
“rights as effectivity” from a normal game form if it is
assumed that the normal game form contains only feasi-
ble strategies (some of which are admissible while oth-
ers are nonadmissible). In that case effectivity functions
may be too strong for an account of rights. Take, for ex-
ample, my right to wear a blue shirt. Presumably, I have
such a right even though I am unable to choose one—
say, because I messed up the colors of my clothes while
doing my laundry. That is, even though everyone else
has adopted admissible strategies, I may not be effec-
tive (whether in the α- or β-sense) for a set of outcomes
in which I wear a blue shirt. This sort of problem can
be accommodated if it is assumed that the game form
from which effectivity functions are derived can differ
across individuals (Van Hees 1995). We then assign to
each individual a normal game form that describes that
individual’s “deontic realm.” To see whether a person
has a certain right, we examine whether the person is
effective for the relevant set of outcomes in the game
form that has been specifically assigned to that person,
that is, whether someone is effective for that set in that
person’s own deontic realm. Since individuals may have
been assigned different game forms, that is, may have
different deontic realms, the described problems need
not arise. It is, for instance, perfectly possible that I
have the power to see to it that a certain outcome is
realized in my deontic realm, whereas you have in your
deontic realm the power to see to the realization of
the contrary state of affairs.6 Although the notion of a
deontic realm can be interpreted in different ways, it is
clear that insofar as the deontic realms of individuals
differ, they denote different “worlds” (whether possi-
ble or not). But that means that the problems are not
solved by showing that rights are compossible after all,
that is, that they can exist in one and the same possi-
ble world, but by implicitly abandoning the notion of
noncompossibility of rights.
Furthermore, there is a problem that underlies all of
the game-theoretic approaches to rights that have been
developed so far and that consists of their neglect of the
intentions of individuals. For instance, contrary to what
the effectivity approach suggests, rights can exist even
where I am not effective (however defined) in bring-
ing about some outcome. What matters also is whether
someone has deliberately stopped me from being effec-
tive in an illegal manner. Imagine that I am on my way
to the polls but am held up in heavy traffic and they
are closed by the time I arrive. My right to vote has not
been infringed, even though my strategy of voting—
driving to the polls—was not effective—certainly not
in the α-sense but perhaps also not in the β-sense. My
right to vote has not even been infringed if the heavy
traffic was caused by an accident due to someone doing
something illegal—driving faster than the legal limit.
My right to vote would be infringed only if someone
did something illegal in order to stop me from voting,
such as a refusal to recognize my registration card as
legitimate. To accommodate these problems, a game-
theoretic account of rights should also refer to the in-
tentions that individuals have, and thus far this has not
been done.
STEINER’S RIGHTS COMPOSSIBILITY
In both Sen’s and the effectivity approach, rights are
conceived in terms of ways of realizing certain out-
comes. Sen defends his account on the grounds that
actions and their consequences are closely related.
Steiner, too, though he sees rights as pertaining to ac-
tions, understands rights compossibility as concerning
6 Note, incidentally, that an approach in which each person is assigned
their own game form generalizes the one in which there is only one
game form from which all effectivity functions are derived. The latter
then simply forms a special case, to wit, the one in which all individuals
have been assigned the same game form.
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the object-temporal or spatiotemporal coincidence of
the extensional specification of actions. In that sense
actions and their outcomes are closely linked. Further-
more, both the social choice and the effectivity ap-
proach define rights in terms of powers. Steiner’s ac-
count of rights, though not formalized in the same way,
also sees rights much in terms of powers, and so similar
compossibility problems arise.7
In terms of the Hohfeldian classification, Steiner
views rights as claims or immunities such that the right-
holder possesses the powers to enforce or waive the
constraints that are logically implied by it. For instance,
if A has a claim that B performs x, then B has the duty to
perform x unless A waives this duty. In our discussion
of Steiner’s theory we do not focus on these claims or
immunities as such, but on the liberties that are implied
by them. Steiner makes clear that the exercise of rights
that form part of a compossible set of rights should is-
sue in the performance of actions that are compossible.
We argue that this requirement cannot be satisfied in a
meaningful way, which entails that the compossibility
of rights as conceived by Steiner forms a problem.8
An act-type is a class of acts for which each act-
token is an instantiation of that act-type. “Freedom of
expression” is an act-type, for which my saying “Down
with the government” on the pavement at Whitehall
on Thursday, March 8, 2001, at precisely 2:15 PM is an
act-token. But my statement at that time is also an act-
token of the class of acts of saying “Down with the
government.” We normally think of rights and liber-
ties as act-types, or rather more carefully we think of
them as claims for act-types. The right to free speech is
a liberty, immunity against the removal of the liberty,
and rights against certain types of interference with the
exercise of that liberty. Thus the right to be able to
express oneself freely on controversial political, social,
and scientific matters without hindrance from the state,
indeed protection from the state against others who
may illegitimately try to stop me, is a complex set of in-
terrelated rights, liberties, and immunities.9 Whether or
not I want to express myself, or ever do express myself,
7 We have chosen to discuss Steiner in some detail, despite his taking
a choice-based approach to rights as opposed to the more popu-
lar interest-based approach, since his work most carefully and thor-
oughly examines the issue of compossibility.
8 Some people, for example, Jeremy Waldron (1989, 506), maintain
that “when we say rights conflict, what we really mean is that the
duties they imply are not compossible.” But this is too restrictive.
Wellman (1995, 201) points out, using a much-cited example from
Feinberg (1980), that “this is too limited a conception of rights con-
flict. . . . Feinberg’s example reminds us that rights involve a variety
of Hohfeldian positions. Any of these could conflict logically with its
opposite. Just as the liberty of doing some act is the logical contradic-
tory of a duty not to do this act, so one’s power of effecting some legal
or moral consequence is logically incompatible with one’s disability
to effect this consequence.”
9 The nature of what the right of free speech defends is important.
The fact that people can go to shops and verbally inquire about the
price of goods, or talk about personal matters with friends, relatives,
or their doctor, is not enough for there to be free speech. The content
of what one is allowed to speak is what counts. Of course, a defense of
the right of freedom of speech need not be based on the importance
for the speaker, but may also be in terms of what listeners gain from
it (Mill 1848).
on social and political matters does not affect whether
or not my right to do so is protected. (This means both
the protection of my liberty-to-speak by my immunity
and the protection of my ability-to-exercise-my-liberty
by my rights.) Similarly a right to be educated or for
decent health care is the right that the state will facili-
tate provision of education and health care. This is so
whether or not I play truant from school or never feel
the need to go to the doctor. In that sense we ordinarily
think of rights as being about act-types. But if rights are
about act-types, then rights cannot be compossible. Or
at least, to the extent that rights are about act-types,
then we cannot guarantee that the exercise of those
rights on any occasion is compossible. We cannot all
give our conflicting views about the government at the
same place and time, since my occupying this place at
this time entails that you cannot occupy the same place
at the same time. To the extent that resources are lim-
ited, one person’s health care may need to be sacrificed
for another’s, while the amount devoted to the special
educational needs of some may be more limited than
many would wish.
For these reasons Steiner develops an account of
rights compossibility specifically generated in terms of
act-tokens. Immediately, we can see that Steiner’s ac-
count of rights is not the language of ordinary rights
talk. The justification of such a move has to be that it
is the only way to make rights talk coherent, and the
basis of a system of justice. However, if the cost of that
coherence is to divorce it entirely from our moral world,
the cost is too high. Our argument against Steiner is that
is account of rights is so divorced that the cost is indeed
too high.
Steiner identifies an act-token by its extensional de-
scription indicating its physical components. There can
only be one act-token (or a particular act-type) answer-
ing to the same extensional description that has the
same set of physical components. So he defines action
compossibility:
Two actions, A and B, are incompossible if there is partial
(either object-temporal or spatio-temporal) coincidence
between the extensional description of A and either (i) B’s
extensional description or (ii) C’s extensional description if
C is a prerequisite of B. (Steiner 1994, 37, italics removed)
From this Steiner argues that a person, i , is unfree to
do an action if i ’s control of at least one of its physical
components is actually or subjunctively denied by an-
other person j . This implies, according to Steiner, that
j must actually or subjunctively possess at least one of
the physical components denied to i . The subjunctive
element is important to Steiner but its nature may not
be immediately clear.
The subjunctive exclusion refers to an actual exclu-
sion inoperative only because the individual did not at-
tempt the action. Thus if i cannot leave a room because
the door is locked, i is unfree to leave the room even if
i does not attempt to do so (and has no desire to do so).
It does, presumably, include the case where the door is
not locked, but had i attempted to leave the room, it
would have been locked. Say, the bolt is drawn quickly
as i ’s hand touches the handle. Does it include the case
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where the door could have been locked had i chosen to
leave the room, but would not have been, since j , the
person who could have locked the door, would not have
done so? We may assume that j had no desire to lock i
in the room. Steiner is not absolutely clear on this. One
would think, from his discussion on pages 37–38 of An
Essay on Rights (1994), that in such a case, i would be
free. We would think so because i has the subjunctive
freedom to leave the room since, had the attempt been
made, i would have succeeded. Person i would have
left the room even though j could have prevented it
had j so chosen. Control over actions, or the actual or
subjunctive possession of the physical components of
i ’s freedom, is thus existent only given that others with
preventive powers happen not to use them. The free-
dom i has in the actual world does not extend to other
possible worlds where others’ intentions and actions
are different. A person’s control therefore is a control
only of sorts: It is a control given that the person faces
no (effective) resistance; it is not the control the person
would have if there were resistance from others that
is not there. This might be termed “outcome power”
(Dowding 1991, 48).
However, things are not so simple. The problem
arises not when we consider i ’s liberty, but when we
consider i ’s liberty together with j ’s. Steiner insists that
any subjunctive freedoms a person has, only that per-
son can have. No two people can both have the same
subjunctive freedoms. Thus i may be subjunctively free
to post a letter in the mailbox down the road in two
minutes’ time, but only if there is no one else who is
subjunctively free to post a letter in the same mailbox
in exactly two minutes’ time. He says, “Like actual pos-
session, subjunctive possession cannot be ascribed to
more than one person for any one time” (Steiner 1994,
41). The fact that I am able to go and post a letter
two minutes from now might suggest that I have the
freedom to perform that particular act-token. After all,
just as in the example of leaving the room, the freedom
would be absent only if there were resistance from oth-
ers. However, in Steiner’s view, a freedom is always a
possession, and in this case—even in the absence of
any potential resistance—it cannot be the case that I
(subjunctively or actually) possess the same physical
components of that act: There may be a host of others
who could arrive at the mailbox just ahead of me. The
fact that they do not, since none of them wants to post
a letter at that precise moment, is thereby irrelevant.
Steiner, in a discussion of an objection raised by Taylor
(1982, 142–144) to an earlier account of his theory of
freedom (Steiner 1975), acknowledges that it need not
be the case that everything is always in the possession
of one person or another (Steiner 1994, 40). However,
what his account of subjunctive freedoms implies is that
almost nothing can be in the possession of one person
or another: It would seem that no one has any subjunc-
tive freedoms beyond what others could physically stop
them from doing.
This means that a person’s subjunctive freedoms do
not extend very far since, beyond the next few seconds,
a lot of people could do actions that would stop one
from doing much (some people could start a nuclear
war, killing us within the next hour or two). To put the
point more bluntly, the account of subjunctive freedom
must be wrong. Subjunctives rule every possible act we
do and do not do but could do. It means that we are
never free, except in the very limited sense that what we
actually do we are free to do, plus a few acts in the very
near-future that no one could possibly stop us from do-
ing in the actual world. This simply is not what we mean
when we talk about human freedom. The fact that i ’s
attempt to post a letter is thwarted by a queue of people
at the letterbox does not mean that i is not free to post
a letter. It means that i cannot always post a letter pre-
cisely when and where i wants. Or, stated differently,
i does not have the freedom to perform this particular
act-token. Steiner’s account of rights builds on this ac-
count of freedom and thus encounters similar problems.
His choice account of rights is based upon each person’s
freedom being constrained only by the legitimate (or
admissible) actions of others. Where j illegitimately
locks the door on i , then i ’s rights have not been not
been recognized; where j legitimately locks the door
on i , then i ’s rights have not been broken. In both cases,
however, i is not free to leave the room. However, i ’s
rights cover only the cases where freedom to do some
action x is not overwhelmed by some other person j ’s
legitimate actions. Thus i does not have the right to post
a letter in two minutes’ time, given that others subjunc-
tively may also be queuing to post a letter at that exact
time. (To the extent that a set of people may legitimately
set in motion nuclear war at any given moment, nobody
has any rights beyond the next couple of hours.)10
Steiner (1994, 86–101) tries to accommodate these
problems, by drawing on Bentham’s familiar distinction
between vested and naked liberties. A liberty (or per-
mission) refers to the absence of a duty, and should not
be confused with Steiner’s descriptive notion of a free-
dom as discussed thus far. A vested liberty is a liberty
that is protected by the duties that others have, whereas
a naked liberty lacks such protection. The problem dis-
cussed so far can be formulated in terms of vested liber-
ties: We have argued that what we commonly perceive
as freedoms can never be seen as “completely vested.”
Since, by definition, a naked liberty lacks “protection,”
it cannot constitute possession of part of the world and,
hence, cannot form a freedom in Steiner’s sense. Steiner
(1994, 87) does not disagree with this: “The salience of
nakedness in the creation of incompossibilities is clear
enough.” It is for this reason that he argues that rights
should consist of vested liberties (Steiner 1994, 89),
that is, they should consist of liberties surrounded by
“an impenetrable perimeter.” However, the resulting
rights catalog becomes rather peculiar if all rights are
10 As explained in the previous section, this conclusion holds only if
the deontic realms of the individuals coincide. However, it is clear
that the notion of possession as used by Steiner refers to possession
of a part of the world that is the same for all individuals. For instance,
he argues that Becker and McEnroe, when competing for the 1990
Wimbledon Tennis Championship, cannot both be said to be free to
win the championship, because “there’s no possible world in which
two (or more) such attempters can be both unprevented” (Steiner
1994, 41). In other words, the set of possible worlds (the deontic
realm) is assumed to be identical for Becker and McEnroe.
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completely vested, that is, if there is indeed an impen-
etrable perimeter. If we want to say that I have the
right to post a letter, we would have to stipulate that
my vested liberty exists only between, say, 3:00 and
3:05 AM—during other time slots others have the right
to post a letter. Indeed, most activities (to demonstrate,
to practice a religion, to go to a concert, to surf the web,
and so on) that would normally be thought of as the ex-
ercising of rights (a possible instantiation of an act-type
right) should be made permissible to an individual or
small group of individuals only during some particular
slots in time or space. In fact, not even all individuals can
be guaranteed such rights. Should we, for instance, say
that at least some individuals lack the right to practice
a particular religion if it is physically impossible that all
individuals attend a Sunday service?
THE EXISTENCE OF RIGHTS
Much of the discussion thus far has concerned itself
with the sense in which a right exists, though this ques-
tion has not been addressed directly. Before we go far-
ther it is perhaps a good idea that we do address this
question directly. The conditions of rights’ existence are
not straightforward. Rights do not exist in the sense
in which the Economist famously defined economic
“goods” (as opposed to “services”), viz., something that
can be thrown through a window. But they do not exist
even in the sense of an economic service. To the extent
that we can empirically establish (and economists do
empirically measure more or less successfully) the size
of the service economy, the rights existent in a commu-
nity cannot be so (easily) established empirically. The
problem may seem even more difficult once we dis-
tinguish legal from moral rights. To illustrate, consider
a claim that certain legal rights are respected in one
nation but not in another. To confirm this, we might ex-
amine which rights are respected in nation X, compare
this with rights in nation Y, and conclude that there
are indeed more legal rights in X than Y. We may em-
pirically quantify this by showing that more activities
falling under some right R occur in X than in Y. Yet
if we say that there are moral rights in Y that are not
respected, then we are saying that the rights exist in both
X and Y but that the respective states do not recognize
or respect those rights equally.
We make a distinction between a “material” exis-
tence and a “formal” existence of a right. We say that
a right exists materially if it is being respected, which
means that the material existence of a right depends
on the efforts of the state to protect those rights and
on the ability of its population to exercise them. For-
mal existence, on the other hand, depends “only” on
some theory, T, that specifies the rights in question:
Rights formally exist insofar as they are recognized
or proclaimed to exist. The theory that specifies these
rights may be a moral one. It may also be one that
refers to a “general recognition” of such rights, that is,
rights may be seen as constituting some sort of maxim
underlying the equilibrium of a game. Another pos-
sibility would be to say that the theory stipulates that
rights exist in terms of some general recognition backed
by the force of a law—it stipulates legal rights. We do
not provide a separate analysis here of these various
approaches. Rather we fold them into one kind of exis-
tence that may take each or all of these interpretations.
However, further specification along these lines may
be desirable under future more detailed analysis.
To some extent the problem of existence does not
have to be a problem. Quine (1953, 15) famously re-
marked that “to be is to be the value of a variable”
(see also Quine 1939). This famous dictum points out
the importance of a prior doctrine or ontological stan-
dard. This serves well for the existence of rights. Our
rights can be given only by the prior doctrine or stan-
dard and we need consider their existence only with
regard to that doctrine, demanding only that the ex-
istence claims are coherent with regard to the logical
formulation adopted. We can trivially define the exis-
tence of anything by stating the truth-conditions of the
formulae in which it occurs. Less trivially, however, we
may wish to consider how we can represent different
kinds of existence. We present four ways in which rights
can exist (cf. Rescher 1978).
When we speak about the existence of individual hu-
man beings, we speak of the existence of particulars as
contingent members of the world.11 This existence can,
of course, be described in terms of a first-order predi-
cate logic that contains the existence predicate E. We
then write Ek, where k is an individual constant.12 The
first way in which rights can be seen to exist is in terms
of the existence of properties of individuals. To say that
an individual right exists is then to say that certain first-
order predicates apply to certain individuals. Existence
is seen as a second-order predicate that is applied to
first-order predicates in combination with the partic-
ulars to which those first-order predicates applies. At
this point, if a first-order predicate R denotes a certain
right, we do not discuss the existence of such a right
but the existence of this right for a particular individual
k. In a way, the right of k can be seen as a particular,
where the right “as such” is a universal. To indicate that
we talk here about rights that are being proclaimed by
some moral or legal theory without necessarily being
respected, we call this type of existence formal.
(i) The formal existence of a right as a particular:
(Rk).
What can we say about the truth-conditions of such a
formula in a world w? One might claim that (Rk)
holds only if (Ek & Rk). Thus an individual’s right to
breathe fresh air exists if, and only if, the individual
exists and if he/she indeed has this right. This implies
that future generations cannot now have the right to
11 We restrict the analysis to the existence of rights in the actual world
at a certain point in time, that is, we ignore modal aspects.
12 As Hintikka (1969) has shown, if we have a semantic model in
which not every individual term necessarily has a bearer, the formula
“Ek” can be seen to be equivalent to the formula “∃i (k = i)” thereby
also giving the formal rendition of Quine’s famous saying. See also,
for example, Quine 1970, chap. 5.
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breathe fresh air in the future. While this may be ac-
ceptable to some (it does not imply, for example, that
we do not have obligations to future generations so that
they can, in the future, have such rights), we may not
want to exclude the existence of such rights on logical
grounds only. We might therefore be inclined to infer
that (Rk) presupposes only Rkrather than (Ek& Rk).
But then we are still making a particular ontological
presupposition, to wit, the existence of the universal R.
If we say that some individual possesses a right R, we
assume that R is a right that exists that individuals may
or may not possess. Now let  again be the second-
order predicate describing the existence of first-order
predicates. Hence, we now also distinguish
(ii) the formal existence of a right as a universal: R
and we claim that (Rk) should be defined partly in
terms of R. That is, we believe that to say that an
individual formally possesses a particular right pre-
supposes that the right formally exists as a universal.
For instance, a bill of rights stipulates which rights ex-
ist formally as universals, and this in turn determines
which rights formally exist as particulars. With respect
to formal existence, the universals thus have ontolog-
ical priority. The question of the formal existence of a
right as a particular shifts to the formal existence of the
corresponding universal, that is, the formal existence
of the freedom or right as such. It is here that a prior
theory T is needed that recognizes this existence.13
Such recognition makes clear which rights there are
formally and, also, which individuals possess those
rights. It does not, however, establish the more “def-
inite” or “concrete” existence of rights when they are
respected or exercised. To capture the “material” exis-
tence of rights, we introduce a different existence pred-
icate, ε.
(iii) The material existence of a right as a particular:
ε(Rk).
What can we say about the truth-conditions of formulas
of type iii? In this case we again take recourse to the
prior theory T, that is, the theory also needs to stipulate
the conditions that should be fulfilled before we can say
that the rights a person formally possesses are respected
or exercised. Assume that the fulfillment of these con-
ditions can be described in terms of a formula δ of the
formal language at hand and that the formal existence
of a right is a necessary requirement for its material
existence. We might then hold that ε(Rk) ⇔ (Rk) &
δ. Thus an individual right exists materially if it exists
formally and if the right is respected or exercised.
The distinction between formal and material exis-
tence can in turn be applied to rights sui generis. We
can say, for instance, that although some society for-
13 We do not attempt here to specify the exact way of deriving the
particulars from the universals. Note, however, that the existence of
a right sui generis does not necessarily imply that every individual
possesses the right in question.
mally acknowledges some right, it is being violated—
without our thereby referring to the violation of rights
of specific individuals.
(iv) The material existence of a right as a universal: εR.
Whereas the formal existence of rights as universals
can be established without reference to the rights as
particulars that individuals possess formally, the onto-
logical priority is reversed with respect to the material
existence of rights as universals: A society can formally
acknowledge a right sui generis, but to say that those
rights also exist materially, we first have to examine
which rights materially exist as particulars.
To summarize, we have argued that to begin to ana-
lyze rights by their exercise is mistaken, but it is surely
correct that rights “exist” in the most “definite” or
“concrete” sense when they are exercised or respected
by others’ actions. In some important sense, rights es-
sentially “exist” in terms of i and ii: Otherwise we would
not be able to claim that rights are not being respected
by the laws of some state or through actions of members
of society. However, rights also have a more concrete
existence when they are respected or exercised. This
is captured by iii and iv. Thus the analysis of rights
should begin at the level of the formal existence of
rights sui generis (level ii), proceed to the formal exis-
tence of rights as particulars (level i), and then proceed
to the level of material existence of rights as particulars
(level iii) and rights sui generis (level iv), respectively.
Of course, the nature of the existence of rights under i
and ii is a form of “bootstrapping.” Rights exist in the
sense that they are thought to exist (whether through
moral theory, through beliefs underlying behavior, or
by law) but thinking that they exist leads to a more con-
crete existence through behavior itself or state action.
Rights can thus be seen in terms of expectations.
Through our recognition of others’ rights we behave
differently toward them. In other words, rights are part
of our social institutions that may be defined in terms
of equilibrium strategies. There is a large and growing
literature that examines social institutions in terms of
equilibrium arrangements (see, for example, Calvert
1995, Ostrom 1991, and Schotter 1981). Specific appli-
cations of institutional theory to the analysis of rights
can be found in Sened (1997) and Van Hees (2000a).
Our rights theories both track such equilibrium strate-
gies and criticize or try to modify such behavior. Often
groups may try to construct new rights by extending
previous claims to new domains. If such rights can form
new social institutions, then these groups may be suc-
cessful. In other words, moral systems and ways of rep-
resenting them grow through both argument and be-
havior, the latter (as Rawls importantly noted) putting
constraints upon the successes of the former.
This section merely forms a sketch of the nature of
the existence conditions of rights. As said, the crucial
parts of those conditions—the conditions δ and the the-
ory of which they form a part—have not been specified
yet. Leaving aside the issue of the material existence
of rights as universals, we analyze in the next section
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how the condition δ may be cashed in, that is, what it
means to say that an individual right exists materially.
Below we examine what that analysis entails for the
other parts of the theory T.
MEASURING RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
These considerations lead us to examining the expecta-
tions that one may have about exercising one’s rights.
We briefly outline the possibilities of an approach to
rights that circumvents some of the problems discussed
pertaining to noncompossibility. In two important as-
pects we deviate from the three approaches to rights
discussed above. First, we focus on the freedom to
perform act-types rather than act-tokens, thus coming
closer to ordinary rights vocabulary. Second, we re-
verse the relation between judgments about which spe-
cific freedoms an individual has and judgments about
the extent (or degree) of a person’s (overall) freedom.
Rather than examining which freedoms an individual
has and, on the basis of that information, examining
the extent of a person’s freedom, we derive a judgment
about what freedoms a person (materially) has from
judgments about the extent of that person’s freedom.
Although we limit the analysis to showing how a mea-
surement of (overall) freedom can help to establish the
existence of (particular) freedoms, we also claim that
the approach can be used to establish the existence of
other types of rights.
We want to ascertain whether a person (materially)
possesses a certain act-type right R and we assume that
the individual possesses the right in the formal sense.
Let r1, . . . , rk denote act-tokens instantiating the right.
R may stand, for instance, for freedom of speech, and r1
may stand for shouting “Down with the government”
at Whitehall at a given time and date, r2 may stand for
shouting the same thing at Piccadilly Circus, and so on.
Now we want to derive a “freedom function” 
 that as-
signs a value between 0 and 1 to each R—the value
(R)
describing the extent to which a person is free to do R.
Suppose that for each act-token ri , we can define the
probability p(r1) that the act-token will, in the relevant
manner, not be prevented. Assuming that these prob-
abilities determine to what extent a person is free to
perform R, we have 
(R) = 
(p(r1), . . . , p(rk)). That
is, the extent to which a person is free to do R depends
on the probabilities with which each of the relevant
act-tokens will not be prevented.
It might be objected by those taking an all-or-nothing
view to the existence of freedom that what we are spec-
ifying here is “the probability of a person’s being free
to perform R” rather than the extent to which he/she
is free to do R.14 To the extent that our analysis is
consistent with the “all-or-nothing” view of liberty or
freedom, there is perhaps nothing wrong with inter-
preting freedom in this manner. We take it that our
analysis teases out what most people mean when they
talk about freedom. However, the fact that everything
14 Kramer (2002) argues for such a view. In a personal communica-
tion Kramer points out that, apart from this quibble, his approach is
perfectly consistent with the rest of the analysis.
can be translated from everyday language to a clumsier
formulation is not a reason for preferring the latter:
especially so when one considers that the implication
of the clumsy formulation is that what people value in
a free society is not the extent of their freedom, but
“the probability of being free to do R, S, . . . .” We claim
that the extent of people’s freedom is specified by their
probability of being free to do R, S, . . . , but see no
point in declaring that people are wrong about what
they claim they value. In other words, analyzing these
claims in terms of a formal language (a translation) is
preferable to attempting to change the claims into a
language most people would not recognize.
For Steiner, rights pertain to act-tokens, not to act-
types. If one, neverthless, wants to make claims about
the existence of act-type rights, it seems that there is
only one way of carrying out such an analysis that is
compatible with Steiner’s approach. As we saw, for
Steiner, having a right means possessing a part of the
world. If a person has the act-type “freedom of speech,”
then there should be at least one act-token instantiating
it that the person can be sure to realize. The main non-
compossibility problem described thus far—the impos-
sibility of ensuring that a person can perform some act-
token—can now be taken to mean that the probability
that some particular act-token will not be prevented
will usually not be one. If δ indeed stipulates that the
value of at least one of the relevant probabilities should
be one, then rights are noncompossible. But this is too
strong. We cannot be said not to possess the right of
free speech, the right to attend a church service, the
right to post a letter, and so on, simply because in some
circumstances we are not able to exercise them.
We cannot say that the material existence of a right
depends on at least one of the relevant act-token prob-
abilities having a value of one. It seems much more
natural to suppose that the existence will depend on
the value that the function 
 assigns, and this value
may be positive even if all of the relevant act-token
probabilities are lower than one. Indeed, as the exten-
sive recent literature on measuring freedom suggests,
there are many ways in which the function 
 can be
defined (see, for example, Arrow 1995, Carter 1999,
Dowding 1992, Pattanaik and Xu 1990, 1998, Rosen-
baum 2000, Sen 1991, Sugden 1998, and Van Hees
2000a). One possibility is for the value to be determined
by the act-token with the highest probability of not
being prevented. Thus, if at Piccadilly Circus, I have
the highest probability of not being prevented from
protesting, then that probability describes the extent
of my freedom of speech. Another possibility might
be to take the average values of the various probabil-
ities. For instance, one could argue that the extent of
freedom is severely limited if one is only permitted to
protest at a particular place – the other probabilities
should therefore also be taken into account. Deciding
between these and the many other possibilities may be
a very difficult task, and this is not the place to explore
this issue further.15 Let us simply suppose that we have
15 One could also argue that the value of 
 should depend on
the probabilities that various sets of compossible act-tokens will be
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a particular 
 with which we can establish the extent
to which a person is free to perform various act-types.
This information is used subsequently to define which
act-types a person is free to perform. Again, an all-or-
nothing approach is counterintuitive: We do not say
that a person lacks the freedom to perform a particu-
lar act-type if, and only if, the extent of that person’s
freedom to perform that act-type is one. It may be
more plausible to claim that for each act-type right,
a specific threshold value exists: If the relevant 
 value
exceeds that value, the person has the right; otherwise
he/she does not. Although there is no particular point in
time or public place at which I can be absolutely sure
to have the opportunity to protest against the govern-
ment, the value of 
 will be sufficiently high to say that
my right is unaffected.16 The proposition δ, which is
used to determine whether an individual right exists
materially, thus is true indeed.
Such a method departs from the usual approaches
to the measurement of freedom. Rather than starting
with the freedoms an individual has and subsequently
building a judgment about the extent of the person’s
freedom, the order is reversed. First, we examine the
extent to which a person is free to perform certain act-
types. That extent, which is specified by 
, and a spec-
ification of the various threshold values, subsequently
determines which (material) freedoms and rights an in-
dividual is said to have. In other words, first we measure
how free individuals are and then we determine which
freedoms and rights they have.17 Although we have
only illustrated the approach with respect to the estab-
lishment of freedoms, the framework is general enough
to derive judgments about the existence of other types
of rights.
This is just a brief outline of an alternative approach.
Many questions still need to be addressed. Particularly
relevant is the question of how the various Hohfeld
types of rights can be distinguished within our frame-
work. Although the probabilities pertain to the free-
dom to perform an act and thus to liberty-rights only,
the other Hohfeld types can be described in terms of
these liberty-rights. For instance, to say that A has a
claim-right that B performs x means that B has the
liberty to perform x and does not have the liberty not
to perform x, and it also entails that A has the liberty to
perform an action (i.e., to waive the duty) such that the
resulting state of affairs is one in which B does have
the liberty to abstain from performing x. Moreover,
many questions need to be addressed with respect to
unprevented, rather than on the probabilities that singular act-tokens
will be unprevented. For an elaborate defense of such an approach,
see Carter 1999.
16 There may be places where no absolute right is important. One
would hardly claim that we have the right to free speech if it is al-
lowed only where no one else can hear. There is a difference between
protesting down Whitehall or Piccadilly Circus and being allowed to
march only on Dartmoor.
17 Note that our analysis suggests that how δ is specified is a choice
that is made given judgments about the world in which freedoms are
being considered. It is an a posteriori judgment that cannot be made
independent of our experience of the world and our expectations of
what is practically possible.
the nature of 
 and the various threshold values. We
do not go into these questions here, but we mention
various advantages of the approach that may help to
motivate further exploration. First, the use of thresh-
old values enables us to make clear that for some rights
act-token incompossibilities matter more heavily than
for others. At the same time, the costs of raising the
probabilities of rights being exercised also matter. For
example, having access to medical care may be thought
to be more important than being able to post a letter at a
nearby mailbox. But ensuring that one may have one’s
health problems sorted out, no matter what they are, is
far more costly than ensuring good access to mailboxes.
Both importance and cost need to be considered when
considering threshold values.
Second, the approach may enable us to incorporate
the earlier-mentioned relation between intentions and
rights. After all, others’ intentions affect the proba-
bilities. If others intend to prevent me from going to
the voting booth, and they have the means to carry
out—or at least try to carry out—these intentions, then
the probability that I will be able to vote will affect
the relevant 
 value. My right is violated only when the
relevant 
 value falls below the threshold value. The
threshold value may be much lower when noninten-
tional acts stop me from voting. For example, if the
journey to the voting booth is very long and hazardous,
with a high probability of failure, even though no one is
trying to stop me, we may feel that one does not have the
right to vote. (Or imagine that there are so few voting
booths open, for such a short period of time, that it is
not possible for all those registered to vote at that booth
to do so in the time it is open. As recent events have
shown, this example is not fantastic.) In this case, the
low probability of my being able to exercise my right
should be obvious, and one may legitimately expect
the state to increase that probability—by increasing the
number of voting booths, allowing postal votes, and so
on. This approach allows us to recognize, however, that
my right to vote is not always violated when someone
does something to stop me, as in the traffic accident ex-
ample discussed above. What matters is the probability
of being able to exercise the right and the reasons why
that probability holds.
Third, the approach enables us to make clearer the
distinction between rights and freedoms. Freedom is
a generic term that refers to all possible acts, whereas
rights refer to acts the probabilities of which are af-
fected by legal or moral considerations. My right to
vote implies that I am protected against others’ acting
against me in certain ways and for which provisions are
made such that I have a given minimum probability
(the threshold value) of being able to exercise the right.
Without that legal protection, the relevant probability
would be lower.
Fourth, we may note that it enables us to handle
positive rights and negative rights in much the same
manner. In both cases we are looking at the probabili-
ties of our rights being, in the first case, respected and,
in the second, exercised. It thereby also enables us to
take due consideration of the moral value of rights and
of the costs of protecting them. One may expect any
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society to value the same negative and positive rights
equally, but not expect a poor society to be able to
protect negative rights as strongly or provide as many
positive rights as a rich one.
CONCLUSION
Rights are noncompossible in an important sense.
Rights as defined in both the social choice-theoretic
and the game-theoretic approaches are noncompossi-
ble. Steiner’s sophisticated attempt to specify a form of
rights as act-tokens also fails to deliver rights compos-
sibility in any interesting sense. If one is free to do some
action only if one is subjunctively free to do it and others
are not as subjunctively free, then the rights one has
over such actions are nonexistent or vanishingly small.
While Steiner’s account is not strictly logically contra-
dictory, when examined it looks more like a reductio ad
absurdum of rights theory than a defense. Certainly it is
far from the nature of rights as recognized in traditional
political theory and in everyday moral talk.
The noncompossiblity of rights is an embarrassment
especially to those who want to argue that rights form
the foundation or basis of justice. Those who see rights
as an important component of our moral and political
thought can view their noncompossibility with equa-
nimity. We can still attempt to measure and quantify
individual rights by the extent of individual freedoms
to carry out actions, and to not be subject to the domi-
nation of others, within the scope of the rights presup-
posed by moral theory. The extent of these freedom
judgments does not require that individuals necessarily
are able to carry out everything they wish under the
terms of the rights. That is what is meant by rights non-
compossibility. We cannot all exercise all of our rights
simultaneously, but it does not follow from that that we
do not have those rights. Where rights clash, we exam-
ine the grounds of the rights and other moral consider-
ations to see which rights claim should prevail, in each
circumstance. Moral theories are not complete, they
develop over time, but our moral theory does guide
such decisions.
If rights are noncompossible but form an important
part of moral and political theory, it is natural to ques-
tion the nature of their existence. Quantifying their ex-
istence conditions is not a trivial matter. Rights exist in
many senses. They exist as presupposed by a moral or
political theory. They exist as claims under such a the-
ory. They exist in the sense that individuals recognize
their existence and act accordingly. They exist as set out
in legal documents subject to defense by the state and
private litigation. We have begun to tease out some of
these existences and place them in the context of their
exercise and recognition.
While rights do not guarantee their own exercise,
they have only a weak existence (a theoretical exis-
tence) if there is no chance of their being respected by
others or of their being exercised. This suggests that
we need to examine the probability that individuals’
rights will be respected and that they may be able to
exercise their rights. These judgments will depend upon
prior moral considerations—which include what types
of actions and constraints need to be taken into account
in the probability judgments, what kind of freedom
function we understand, and so on. There is no reason
to think that every right should have the same prob-
ability of being successfully exercised. Many consider-
ations, both pragmatic and moral, enter into the con-
sideration of what threshold value—or probability—
each exercise should take. Different threshold values
may exist for different sorts of rights, and such thresh-
old values may have to be traded one for another in
different societies. “Overall” comparison of rights or
freedoms across societies may be extremely difficult or
even impossible. However, it does not rule out com-
parisons with respect to certain categories of rights and
freedoms for partial comparability.
Can the notion of compossibility of rights also be
applied to our alternative conception of rights? Theo-
retically, it can. However, it is doubtful whether it is pos-
sible to give a proof of compossibility or noncompossi-
bility to a reasonable set of rights within our framework.
Given the logical relations between various right types,
and the interdependence of the various probability dis-
tributions, constructing a (nontrivial) set of rights that
can be shown to be compossible (or noncompossible)
would be complex.18 Yet it can be safely inferred that
since our probabilistic account of rights is weaker than
the other accounts of rights we have described, com-
possibility results are more likely to occur. More im-
portantly, however, is that the issue of compossibility
has lost its urgency in our framework. Compossibility
may be one consideration relevant in the construction
of rights, and hence in establishing, for instance, the
various threshold values, but in our framework there is
no reason for giving it a priori overriding importance.
Our formal approach to the nature and measurement
of rights and freedom is more in tune with everyday
intuitions and standard accounts of rights in political
philosophy than extant formal accounts. It provides a
framework to start an assessment of the extent of rights
in different nations understood in different senses and
allows us to measure rights and freedoms both through
the statutory and institutional forms in which they may
be identified in different countries and through their
exercise. The number of people who exercise rights in
one country relative to the number in another, taking
into account other relevant features, gives us an indica-
tion of the probability that such rights can be exercised.
The distribution of such exercise across different social
groups also gives us an indication of the bias in any
system of rights.
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